Fama And French Three Factor Model and the Small Value Premium

In my Lazy Portfolios post, you'll notice that many of them overweight the small and value components.  Why do investment advisors often recommend this approach?  I thought it would be interesting to delve deeper into answering that question in this post.

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

Before going into details of the Three Factor Model, it's first important to have a brief understanding of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) on which the Three Factor is largely based.  CAPM basically only uses market risk (systemic and non-systemic) as a proxy for expected return.  Its equation is Ra = Rf + Ba(Rm - Rf), where Rf is the risk free rate of return, Ba is the beta of the security, and Rm is the expected market return.  Essentially, as explained by this equation, investors are compensated by risk as measured by beta and time value.  As investopedia explains:
The CAPM says that the expected return of a security or a portfolio equals the rate on a risk-free security plus a risk premium. If this expected return does not meet or beat the required return, then the investment should not be undertaken. The security market line plots the results of the CAPM for all different risks (betas).
Fama and French Three Factor Model

Eugene Fama, a professor at Booth, and Kenneth French , a professor at Tuck, developed a model by which to further describe market behavior, expanding on the CAPM.  They published their findings in the Journal of Finance in 1992 ("The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns") and provided more details a year later in the Journal of Financial Economics ("Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds").  While CAPM uses the single factor of beta to compare returns, Fama and French found that to be too simplistic of an approach and added both size and value as factors to the model.  They found that historically stocks with high book-to-market ratios (i.e. value stocks) and small-cap stocks have performed better than the market at large.  Thus, they simply added to the end of the CAPM equation expressions SMB ("small (market capitalization) minus big"), HML ("high (book-to-price ratio) minus low"), and alpha.   This new equation accounts for the tendency of outperformance of these two factors and gives a better comparison tool for evaluating fund performance, among other uses.

The important part of their findings to us as individual investors and the main take home message is value stocks tend to perform better than growth stocks and small caps typically outperform large cap companies.  Thus, portfolios with a high percentage of small cap and value would result in a lower value using this model than the CAPM, since it adjusts downward on those two accords.

(click to enlarge)
As you can see from the above chart courtesy of the New York Times (who used Fama and French's data), since 1926 small-cap value companies have hugely outperformed large-cap growth firms.  Note that this is on a logarithmic scale and not linear, so the outperformance doesn't look as dramatic as it could.  But this is a nearly a 100-fold (or 10,000%) difference!

Here is another chart from Index Funds Advisors, showing the growth of $1 from 1928 to 2007.   The annualized return is on the y-axis while risk in the form of standard deviation is on the x-axis.  Small-value experienced a 14.6% annualized return (albeit with higher risk) while large-growth had a 9.6% annualized return through December 2004.  One interesting datapoint on this chart is small-growth, which has historically had relatively weak returns with a high standard deviation.
(click to enlarge)
 Source: Index Funds Advisors


Small-Value Premium

Not only do small-cap and value plays have higher expected return, but they also provide additional diversification.   While one may think that simply "owning the entire market" is as diversified as one can get in US equities, the weighting mechanism that indices use is "a far different outcome from what one would expect," explains Larry Swedrow in What Wall Street Doesn't Want You to Know.  "Almost 70%  of the portfolio is large-cap growth stocks."  He recommends putting a large percentage of the portfolio in small-cap or value funds to compensate for this perhaps seemingly bizarre weighting.  When your large-cap growth zigs, your small-cap or value holdings may zag, enabling you to sustain performance even in bearish times.  Of course, these asset classes aren't perfectly negatively correlated so it's not going to be a flawless zig/zag relationship (nothing is unless you're shorting and long in the same position, which would be pretty pointless), but at least it presumably provides protection against the downside while at the same time increasing your expected return.  A double win!

As stated above with the Fama French Model, but it doesn't hurt to emphasize this point, since small-caps and value typically carry larger risks, the expected return must be greater to compensate.  This is the small-value premium that people seek.  

What this means for your portfolio

Personally, I think it makes the most sense for individual investors to simply hold small-cap value and ignore small-blend and large value.  I find this simplified approach meets the desired results and is easier to hold and maintain in a tax efficient manner.  Some aggressive investors prefer a 50/50 split between total stock and small-value.  I personally like approximately a 2:1 total stock to small value ratio.  Value, small-cap, and small-cap value funds are typically less tax efficient than a total stock market fund counterpart, so it probably makes sense to hold the small-cap value in retirement accounts.  Although examining the tax cost ratio via Morningstar of a fund like VISVX (Vanguard Small-Cap Value Index) shows the difference is negligible (in fact, VISVX seems to be more tax efficient than VTSMX over certain periods) , so holding it in taxable account certainly isn't the worst thing you could do.

Remember the media calling 2000-2010 the "lost decade" as the S&P was virtually unchanged?  Well, if you had invested a considerable sum in small-cap value, your portfolio would be in seriously positive territory for that period.  Not so lost anymore!  From January 14, 2000 to June 10, 2010 (today), Vanguard Total Stock Market is down nearly 17%.   It certainly would seem like a waste of investments if that was your return after 10 whole years.  VISVX, on the other hand, is up 64% over the same period - an outperformance of 81%!  And you thought those timing strategies had good outperformance.  This strategy simply calls for setting a slightly different asset allocation and letting it be (which is much more tax efficient) and absolutely obliterated more complicated, tax-inefficient strategies.

Let's take a look at the growth of $10,000 chart of Total Stock Market and Small-Cap Value since June 1998.  The blue line is total stock, while the orange line is small value.

  (Source: Morningstar Inc.)

As you can see, from 1998 to mid-2000, the total stock market largely outpeformed small-cap value as tech growth stocks were all the rage and escalated in value like no other time in history.  When the tech bubble burst in 2000, though, you'd certainly be glad you had small-cap value to provide diversification and to offset some risk.    In the 2000 to January 2003 period, the total stock market plummeted 36%, while small-cap value enjoyed a small (but real) 4% gain.  That is the zig/zag action we were talking about earlier.  The 1998-2003 timeframe illustrates this diversification benefit perfectly.  While the total stock market took you on a roller coaster ride (where your $10,000 grew to $13,000 before falling to $8,000), small-cap value had a different trajectory and would have somewhat abated that volatility (for both the upside and downside).

In the end, after twelve years your $10,000 invested in VTSMX grew to nearly $12,000, while small-cap value blossomed to nearly $19,500.  That's the small-cap premium we're looking for!

Just as a comparision, here is a chart comparing total stock (blue) with value (yellow), small blend (green), and small-value (orange).  As you can see (although this won't always be the case), small-value really provides the best of both worlds in the Fama French model.  

  (Source: Morningstar Inc.)
The Value Index largely mirrored total stock (although provided some refuge during the growth uprun and demolition from 1998-2003), while small-blend provided more diversification, and small-value gave even a larger return due to its premium.

This strategy should be in the arsenal of all indexing individual investors.  Small-cap value provides greater expected return and increased diversification with the caveat that one should expect slightly more volatility and risk.

Edit: DIY Investor brought up a good point in the comments that investors with lower risk tolerances (e.g. retirees) might want to think twice before "loading up" on these asset classes based on the downside risk, standard deviation, and volatility measures.  I certainly agree and probably should have mentioned this above as there is certainly is increased risk in these asset classes.  However, as I responded, I think investors are more than amply compensated for the additional risk.  A retiree with a 40/60 equities/bonds portfolio might have something like 20% Total US, 10% Foreign, and 10% US Small Value based on my proposed 2:1 US Total to small value.  10% Small-Value, even with its volatility, is not going to wreak havoc on that portfolio and would marginally increase your risk (while correspondingly increasing your expected return).  Looking at the alpha measures of VISVX (quite simply, a risk-adjusted measure of performance; of course, past performance doesn't guarantee future results), VISVX has a 3-year alpha of 6.68 (with a beta of 1.28) and a 1-year alpha of 6.68.  That is, VISVX has enjoyed nearly a 7% outperformance (annually) of what CAPM would predict (i.e. after taking risk/beta/volatility into account).  VTSMX, for comparison has an alpha of 1.18 (and beta of 1.03, as expected).  As stated, this doesn't guarantee anything for the future, but historically the alpha values for small-value are favorable and investors have been more than compensated for the increased risk.  But, it is important to stress, that the increased risk is real, so you should take this into account if you plan to dip in this asset class.

Update 6/16/10: Larry Swedroe's recent article on why the Small Growth Index is the "Black Hole of Investing."  That's why I avoid it all together.

Market goes nuts - VTI down 33%, recovers 29% in a matter of a few minutes

Wild ride on the market today.  (Still ongoing.)  VTI (Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF) was down 33% at one point, and then in a matter of a few minutes recovered nearly 29%.  (Note that this was not how much the actual stocks in the ETF went down as ETFs are priced by the highest bidder; many ETFs suffered presumably from liquidity issues.  Hence, my title is a bit misleading.)  The Dow sunk nearly 1000 points, or 9.8%, and quickly shot back up 600 points.  Heck, VB (Vanguard Small Cap ETF) was down 96% at one point (to 0.1; the bid price that is, the ask was still somewhat normal so purchasing at that price wouldn't have gone through) and then quickly shot back up.   Some people made a whole lot of money today, while others lost a bundle.  

I can't even load the Yahoo! Finance webpage.  Apparently, several people are unable to access their brokerage accounts.

Get this: it appears that an order went through for 39,000 shares of VTI for around $39!  VTI is now at 57.6.  That computer made somebody a lot of money.
 
More to come....

Update 4:05 PM ET: CNBC is reporting that the crash was caused by a trading error at Citigroup.  Earlier reported simply to be a "major firm."

Update 7:30 PM ET: It appears that there was a technical glitch in a variety of stocks, including P&G.  Nasdaq and NYSE are canceling all trades that moved more than 60%.  So, any of those VB trades at ridiculously low prices are canceled; however, the VTI trade @ 39 will stand as it's within 60%.

Update 5/7/10:  It seems as if the "fat fingers" theory blamed on Citigroup was pre-mature, and there is no evidence to substantiate it.

Vanguard Joins the Price War! Free VG ETF Trades and Cheap Equity Commissions

Wow! That is all I can say about the latest development. Vanguard just announced that its brokerage clients can now trade their entire 46 low-cost ETFs commission free! On top of that, they majorly slashed their equity commissions, which used to not be competitive with the rest of the market. Most commissions will be $7 or $2.

Here are the details:

New commission rates for ETFs and stocks 

Assets invested in Vanguard funds and ETFs

_________________
Commissions for Vanguard ETF transactions
_________________
Commissions for equity transactions

_______________
Less than $50,000
(standard rate)
Free $7 for the first 25 (subsequent trades $20)
$50,000–$500,000
(Voyager®)
Free $7
$500,000–$1 million
(Voyager Select®)
Free $2
$1 million or more
(Flagship®)
Free First 25 free
(subsequent trades $2)

Taken from https://personal.vanguard.com/us/insights/article/commissions-05042010

Vanguard CEO Bill McNabb explained:
For 35 years, Vanguard has been committed to reducing the cost of investing in mutual funds for our clients. Now, Vanguard is expanding our low-cost commitment to ETFs. Importantly, Vanguard offers a greater choice of ETFs with expense ratios that are among the lowest in the industry.

This Money article has more information and quotes. Yet again I need to update my Vanguard, Schwab, and Fidelity comparison post. This action is clearly in response to Schwab's and Fidelity's prior unveilings and it's great to see Vanguard attempt to remain competitive in all facets. Great news all around!

Note that there a few fine print issues that are important to note. First of all, it appears that the $50 fee for ETF conversion has been eliminated. Also note that "if you buy and sell the same Vanguard ETF in a Vanguard Brokerage account more than 25 times in a 12-month period, you may be restricted from purchasing that Vanguard ETF through your Vanguard Brokerage account for 60 days." Lastly, it appears that there is still a 1% redemption fee of up to $250 for selling non-Vanguard No-Transaction Fee funds held less than 180 days.

Update: DIY Investor brought up a good point in the comments section that I thought I'd add to this post. The free commissions may lead certain investors to increase their trading frequency tremendously, which, according to various behavioral economics studies, has proven to be overwhelmingly unsuccessful. McNabb addresses this point, further emphasizing Vanguard's underlying Jack Bogle approach to investing for the long-term:
To be clear, our commission-free offer is not intended to encourage the active trading of ETFs, which we believe is counterproductive and rarely successful.
Of course, that warning certainly won't convince all individuals. At least, Vanguard does have in the fine print that they reserve the right to restrict ETF purchases for those actively trading them above a certain threshold. This leads us to the one major concern of this announcement for investors that are disciplined, dollar-cost average indexers - since these transactions certainly do cost money and Vanguard is an "at-cost" provider, are they going to have to increase the expense ratios of their funds to compensate for those that excessively trade? Well, one could argue that the increased assets that will be poured in as a result will help to reduce costs and the economies of scales of the ETFs will reduce spreads and increase liquidity, making Vanguard ETFs even better. Rick Ferri, CFA, as quoted in the above linked article, suggests that Vanguard's patented structure of mutual funds/ETFs will make this commission free trading advantageous to Vanguard mutual fund holders as well. In any event, there certainly are a couple reasons for caution that will be interesting to monitor, but, in the end, I still see this as a very positive development for Vanguard customers.

Judge Rules Against Schwab in YieldPlus Fund Case

Last week a judge ruled that Charles Schwab (NYSE: SCHW) violated the law with its YieldPlus Mutual Fund (SWYSX) when it held upwards of 50% mortgage-backed securities without shareholder approval. (See "Angry Schwab bond-fund customers win in court" and "Judge Rules Charles Schwab Violated Law in YieldPlus Mutual-Fund Case.") This case, somewhat surprisingly, has not been publicized much.  With the fund seeking to increase its appeal to the masses, its managers loaded up on risky mortgage-related structured debt to increase its yield, and consequently its assets ballooned to $13 billion in 2007.  In other words, the strategy worked.  The collapse of the mortgage market in 2008, however, led the fund to lose a whopping 36% of its value, a far cry from the advertised description of the fund as a low-risk alternative to money market and cash accounts.  The fund is currently described as seeking "high current income with minimal changes in share price."  This lawsuit reminds me of the one filed against Schwab's total bond fund for the same reason, which I reported in my Lazy Portfolios post.

In 2001, Schwab apparently stated that the fund would hold a maximum of 25% of its assets in any one particular industry, but amended it in 2006 stating that its fund managers reserved the right to make investment decisions at its own discretion without shareholder approval.  The judge ruled that this went against the Investment Company Act of 1940 that states that once a mutual fund proposes a policy (as Schwab did in 2001), it can only modify the asset allocations after an okay from the majority of the shareholders.  While Schwab publicly disclosed its holdings at all times and was transparent in its investments (this certainly wasn't a hedge fund-like case wherein the fund was not clear with its investments), it neglected to seek approval from its investors when changing investment philosophy in an attempt to increase the funds yield and attract additional monies.

Lead attorney for the plaintiff, Steve Berman, explained:
Plaintiffs contend that Schwab wanted complete, unfettered control of the fund so the managers could drive up yields, to in turn attract more investors as YieldPlus grew into the largest ultra-short fund in the country.  Schwab's money managers did, indeed, jump in and gamble, but with other people's money.

This case does not signal to me that Schwab has a wider corporate issue and that you should no longer trust them with your money.  Personally, I think Schwab has some really great low-cost offerings and is a customer-friendly discount brokerage with ample resources and insightful research reports.  In this isolated incident, though, specific fund managers made a particularly egregious judgment in an effort to get more investors into the fund.  This could have easily happened at a variety of different mutual fund families and I still trust Schwab as much as I would any other highly-respected brokerage firm.

There are two important lessons to learn from this debacle, though.  First, monitor your investments regularly and look closely at the holdings of every fund you own to ensure that it meets your standards and risk tolerance.  In this case, simply reading the prospectus or using a fund analyzer tool online for the YieldPlus fund would indicate to any investor that it held greater than 50% of its holdings in privatized mortgage-backed securities.  That would be a red flag to any educated investor as this clearly is at odds with the funds intended risk/reward profile.  Schwab did not try to cover this up and the managers disclosed the funds holdings at regular intervals as required by the SEC.  On the other hand, their general description of the fund was misleading and thus, as an investor, you should learn to delve deeper by reading the prospectus and holdings in detail.  This applies to all sorts of funds, especially "closet-index funds" - that is, actively managed funds that charge you a hefty expense ratio, but when you breakdown the holdings, it is essentially tied to an index benchmark and could be held in a more cost effective manner.  The second lesson from this case is that you must resist the urge to chase yield.  Money managers knew that loading up on MBSs would help sell the fund as the yield surged, but this certainly backfired.  Legendary Vanguard founder Jack Bogle explained that this was a classic example of a firm "reaching for yield" to attract new investors, and a typical action many mutual fund companies cannot resist.  "The message over and over again," Bogle says, "is, 'Go the straight and narrow.'"

The amount of damages will be determined in a trial beginning May 10.

Update 4/20/10: Schwab has decided to settle for $200 million rather than go to trial.   Schwab's statement indicated that settling "allows the company to avoid the distraction and uncertainty of a trial, and the further possibility of a protracted appeals process."  They admit no liability under the settlement, which is still awaiting final court approval.

Book Review: The New Coffeehouse Investor

Bill Schultheis' The New Coffeehouse Investor (Portfolio, rev ed. 2009, 224 pp) builds upon his 11-year old original to devise a simple and common sense approach to long-term saving and investing.  This certainly is not a dense book of tactical investing strategies and terms, so if you're looking for that, this is not where to find it.  Rather, Schultheis essentially writes a "life book" that happens to be primarily focused on investing by saving well, approximating the stock market average, lowering costs, and diversifying with an appropriate asset allocation plan.  The author intersperses his own personal stories throughout, which I found made the book more enjoyable and an easy read.  Not only does he have wisdom in the investment realm, but Schultheis really attempts to give larger "living life advice" and parallels his life experiences with that of investing.  

First, Schultheis begins the book speaking about his interactions with other "coffehouse investors" - that is, friends whom he'd discuss investing ideas at a coffehouse in Seattle with.  Building on his 13-year Wall Street career mostly with Smith Barney, Schultheis argues that listening to stock brokers is a fool's gold and arguments for individual securities such as "I own world-class companies" doesn't hold water, especially if your age and risk tolerance suggests a certain allocation to bonds is more appropriate.  The author really talks about living life (and retirement) to the fullest, rather than constantly worrying about stock picks and your broker.  There are several side stories about his mountain climbing experiences as well as stories from his youth such as building an airplane with his brother.  They serve a couple purposes - first, to make the book interesting and relay these lessons to investing by using various analogies and metaphors, and also to stress what's really important in life - and that's living it.

Schultheis espouses three main principles that guide his philosophy: 1.) Don't put all your eggs in one basket; 2.) There is no such thing a free lunch; and 3.) Save for a rainy day.  In particular, he takes a fairly significant chunk of the book talking about the importance of saving early and the power of compounding; certainly not to the level of not being able to enjoy life, but making certain sacrifices in order to have the retirement you want.  He outlines in details the effects of high expense ratios in mutual funds can have on your bottom line as well as inflation risk, holding small company funds, and the significance of re-balancing.  While Wall Street likes you to believe that stock market risk is huge when compared to inflation risk in the long-term, when looking at 10-year returns on the market, you'll notice that rarely does it go down for a significant period.  Of course there are no guarantees, but for long-term investing, taking a chance on stocks is the way to go and really the ultimate risk is inflationary in nature.  Schultheis urges individuals to ignore the short-term Wall Street stuff and to focus on the big picture.  We know the stock market is volatile in the short-term, but if your investment horizon is significantly longer, this should not be terribly concerning to you.

The author goes on to explain while certain funds will outperform in the index at large for certain periods/categories, sustaining such an outperformance is unheard of and underperfoming by even a seemingly small amount over the course of a long period can lead to a huge reduction in assets.  So, while a fund may be the #1 performing large-cap for the last three-month period, this really is meaningless in the long-run and chasing such returns ends up biting you in the butt.  It's better to have a plan to match the market return with the lowest fees possible, Schultheis argues.  Even large state pension funds follow this strategy, with California indexing 85% and New York 75% (although the author doesn't mention that university endowments typically employ hedge-fund like strategies unlike state funds counterparts).

Schultheis proposing a hypothetical situation and game that he calls "Outfox the Box" that illustrates the index fund versus actively managed fund (or individually picking securities) quite well, so I thought I'd mention it here.  There are ten boxes with money in them, ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 in $1,000 increments:
 
$1,000$2,000$3,000$4,000$5,000
$6,000$7,000$8,000$9,000$10,000

You are told to choose one.  When the boxes show the amounts, it's obvious you'll choose the $10,000 one.  But let's say it looks like this:

$8,000 ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?

In that case, you should choose the $8,000 since it's not worth the risk as chances are you'll get much less than $8,000 if you choose a "question" box.  Picking a "question" box is essentially gambling, and investing should be going with the percentages.  Most likely, you'll choose a box with less than $8,000, and this is equivalent to choosing an actively managed fund as they typically lag the market on top of having higher fees.  A fund that has outperformed in the past is unlikely to do so in the future, and over a 10-year span, something like 85% of actively managed funds lag their benchmark.  Schultheis explains that Wall Street is essentially trying to convince you to give them your money so that their experts can "outfox the box" even though the odds are quite grim that they can do so.  On top of that, they charge much more so the chances of your total return improving is even slimmer.

In the end, this book provides some great analogies and sound advice for simple, long-term investing.  It is not a detail oriented analysis on various strategies and securities, but rather a "life book" that uses life lessons and the author's personal experiences in order to give you a clear picture of how to apply such fundamentals to your own life to ensure financial well-being.   The book is an easy read and provides many examples and supporting figures for his philosophy, and, as such, I think it's a great read for somebody formulating an investing plan.  It isn't, however, revolutionary in nature with its research findings (not that it needs to be) and some may find the tangents distracting rather than enriching.  I found it an enjoyable read that looked at a few topics from a new angle, while reinforcing the guiding principles of my own investing philosophy.

Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
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